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Pursuing a Remedy in Microsoft: The Declining Need for Centralized Coordination in a Networked World
Randal C. Picker†
The en banc decision of the D.C. Circuit in Microsoft1 partially overturning
Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson’s findings of liability and fully rejecting
his proposed break-up remedy sets the stage for a full reset. As discussed
below, the appellate court upheld in large measure the lower court’s finding of monopoly maintenance in violation of Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act;
overturned the finding of attempted monopolization of the browser market; and remanded for a rule of reason analysis of Microsoft’s alleged tying
of Internet Explorer to Windows. The liability ruling alone would have
sufficed to require remand for reconsideration of the appropriate remedy,
but the appeals court also found the remedy process deficient and found
that Judge Jackson’s out-of-court statements gave the appearance of bias.
These provided additional sufficient reasons for overturning the remedy,
and the extra-judicial statements sufficed to give Judge Jackson the boot
on the remand.
Putting to one side possible appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court,2
the ruling therefore means that a new federal district court judge will need
to conduct a hearing on remedy, and the federal government and the
plaintiff States will need to consider whether to pursue the tying claim on
remand. Microsoft has already indicated that it would like to settle, on the
† Copyright © 2001, Randal C. Picker. All Rights Reserved. Paul and Theo Leffmann
Professor of Commercial Law, The University of Chicago Law School. Senior Fellow,
The Computation Institute of the University of Chicago and Argonne National Laboratory. At the Conference, this paper was given under the name of “Understanding Microsoft: The Decline of Centralized Coordination in a Peer-to-Peer World.” I thank conference commentators Christoph Engel and Ulrich Kamecke, as well as Richard Epstein,
Jack Goldsmith, Douglas G. Lichtman, Micheal O’Donnell and participants at a University of Chicago Law School workshop. I also thank the Sarah Scaife Foundation and
the Lynde & Harry Bradley Foundation for their generous research support.
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United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. June 28, 2001) (en banc).

The United States and the plaintiff States have indicated that they will not ask the Supreme Court to review the ruling. See Appellees’ Motion for Immediate Issuance of
Mandate (filed with the D.C. Circuit on July 13, 2001). As discussed below, on July 18,
2001, Microsoft sought rehearing before the D.C. Circuit on one issue. In its July 20,
2001 Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Immediate Issuance of the Mandate, Microsoft indicated that it might seek Supreme Court review but would do so only after the
D.C. Circuit had resolved the petition for rehearing.
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right terms of course, and there is some reason to think that the Bush Antitrust Division would be willing as well. (The States are another matter,
though New Mexico has already jumped in and settled.)
Given the reset, what should happen? How should we think about
an appropriate remedy for the monopoly maintenance violation? How
should the tying claim play out under a rule of reason analysis? What provisions should be central to any possible settlement? This paper offers
thoughts on these questions. It rests on three basic premises:
1. Software sharing is the norm. By this I mean that one piece of software will look to another piece of software for some of its functionality. Without intending too much by these words, one “application” might look to another “application” or an “application”
might look to the “operating system” for this shared code.
2. Software sharing must be coordinated. Programmers make the initial
sharing decision through their design decisions. A program could
be self-contained and rely on nothing else. That could be accomplished either through writing all of the relevant code or by bundling the new code with the code to be shared. Bundling by the
programmer is one form of coordination. If full bundling turns out
not to be sensible—and it often will not—coordination will need to
be achieved through other means. For if a program anticipates that
another program will be present, and it is not, the first program
will fail. A person buying the first program must therefore have access to the second program. Put differently, the first program must
be coordinated with the second program.
3. The Internet has altered the cost of coordination. The rise of the Internet, and more generally, networked computers, has drastically
changed the cost of software coordination. More precisely, decentralized coordination was prohibitively costly prior to the Internet.
This forced us to rely instead on centralized coordination—in
many ways, the Windows operating system. Now, networked coordination or peer-to-peer coordination—of both distribution and
payment—is possible.
These premises push me towards the following conclusions:
1. Windows as Hub. Centralized coordination was achieved most
straightforwardly through direct incorporation of the shared code
into the operating system and naturally accounts for much of the
growth of the size and scope of Windows. Pre-Internet, this ensured that required shared software would be available for programs added later. It also ensured that only one payment was
made for this shared software.
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2. Incorporating IE. A decision to incorporate a browser would have
been perfectly consistent with this prior practice.
3. Understanding Tying. In this framework, the question of tying
turns not on some elusive conception of “separate” or “integrated”
software, but rather on the assignment of the role of coordinator
for shared software. Again, in the pre-network era, such an assignment would flow naturally to the hub.
4. The Network Changes Everything. This changes dramatically in the
network era. Decentralized coordination of shared software is increasingly possible. This would make it possible to radically resize
the operating system. We can easily envision a new, smaller centralized OS, supplemented by additional software acquired through
networked coordination.
We have therefore reached a breakpoint. The prior need for centralized coordination should make us skeptical about the government’s
pending tying claim against Microsoft. If that is right, the plaintiffs are left
“only” with the core ruling on monopoly maintenance. We have a blank
slate on the remedy for that violation. The suggested shift in coordination
possibilities should guide us in crafting that remedy. Given the finding of
monopoly maintenance, the government may be able to jump in now and
facilitate the shift from centralized coordination to networked coordination. To date, I don’t think that the government has understood that its
remedies should be directed at the suggested coordination shift, though
some of the conduct remedies at least might have that consequence; the
suggested and still possible break-up almost certainly would not.
On a going forward basis, we should have substantial doubts about
Microsoft’s need to incorporate new code into the operating system on a
mandatory basis. Given Microsoft’s now demonstrated willingness to use
its control over Windows to preserve its Windows monopoly, we need to
construct a framework to prevent further abuses of the sort seen in this
case. That framework also needs to reflect the substantial difficulties of
identifying in advance precisely what new features might emerge as potential competitors to the operating system.
Section V sets out the suggested remedy in detail, but a remedy
should consist of five central features:
1. DI Visibility Flexibility. There should be no mandatory icons on
the Windows desktop or spots reserved in the Start Menu or its
equivalent. Distribution intermediaries (DIs)—original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs) and others—would have complete freedom to add or subtract icons from the interface.
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2.

Mandatory Versioning. During the remedial period—see 5 below—
Microsoft should be required to issue Windows versions with and
without any new middleware that it adds to Windows. For this to
be meaningful, this means that the baseline Windows XP could
not include instant messaging and the Windows media player, but
that those features could be included in an upgraded version of
Windows XP. Microsoft could charge the same price for basic and
deluxe versions of Windows.
3. Direct Distribution Only Period. For a moratorium period, perhaps
of six months to 2 years, Microsoft should be able to distribute
through distributional intermediaries only the baseline Windows
without the new middleware. Microsoft would be able to distribute
such middleware only through downloading from its website or
through direct distribution of CDs to end-users.
4. DI Neutrality. After the moratorium period, we should rely on
competition among software producers and others for DI “shelf
space”—hard disk space for OEMs, web presence for Internet service providers and others—to control software distribution abuses,
and should only seek to control possible abuses of market power by
limiting conditions that Microsoft can impose on DIs. Mandatory
versioning would be continued during this second period.
5. Sunset. All of these provisions should sunset, perhaps after a period
of three years.
In two sentences, Microsoft distorted the distribution of software through
its monopoly maintenance; the right remedy for that it is to distort back
against Microsoft for a period, and then make sure that Microsoft is not
able to distort distribution again. The presence of the always-on network
means that we can do this while minimizing possible harms to consumers
from introducing a corrective distortion. That said, the direct distribution
remedy may impose interim losses on consumers for uncertain later consumer gains. We need to be sure we are willing to make that investment,
and that turns in part on whether we think that we can restore competition without the direct distribution remedy.
I. A Quick Introduction to the Case
In United States v. Microsoft,3 Judge Jackson reached four legal conclusions:
3 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (“Findings of Fact”); 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C.
2000) (“Conclusions of Law”); 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (“Final Judgment”).
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1. Microsoft maintained its Windows monopoly by anticompetitive
means in violation of Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act;
2. Microsoft attempted to monopolize the Web browser market, also
in violation of Sec. 2;
3. Microsoft impermissibly tied Internet Explorer (IE) to Windows
in violation of Sec. 1 of the Sherman Act; and
4. Microsoft did not engage in illegal exclusive dealing.
These conclusions obviously depended on subsidiary legal findings, including those covering market definition.
In many ways, the three violations found by Judge Jackson turn on
the legitimacy of Microsoft’s decision to distribute IE with Windows. Regardless of what one thinks of the legal conclusions, Judge Jackson was
certainly correct in seeing Microsoft’s decision as having important consequences for competition between Microsoft and Netscape. In his now infamous May 26, 1995 memo on “The Internet Tidal Wave,” Bill Gates
feared that Netscape was playing a platform strategy that would “commoditize” the operating system.4 Developers would write software directly
to the Netscape layer and would cease to write to the underlying OS.
Control would shift from Microsoft to Netscape. Microsoft could drive a
stake in the heart of that strategy by fragmenting the browser market, and
did so when IE captured a substantial market share. The attempted monopolization claim turns largely on the details of a June, 1995 meeting
among assorted Netscape and Microsoft employees, plus Microsoft’s success in displacing Navigator with IE. And the decision to distribute IE
with Windows makes it possible to allege that they have been tied together.
The D.C. Circuit’s through-going review of Judge Jackson’s opinion left only the monopoly maintenance claim intact. The claim of attempted monopolization of the browser market was killed off completely:
the lower court’s finding was overturned and the claim was not sent back
to the lower court for reconsideration. The tying claim was overturned
and remanded for consideration under rule of reason analysis. Each of
these will be discussed in more detail below.

4

Govt. Ex. 20 at 4 (“A new competitor ‘born’ on the Internet is Netscape. Their browser
is dominant, with 70% usage share, allowing them to determine which network extensions will catch on. They are pursuing a multi-platform strategy where they move the key
API into the client to commoditize the underlying operating system”).
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II. Shared Software and Software Coordination
Before doing so, focus on two standard software sharing situations. One
possibility is that two pieces of software will have a common component,
best captured as a file with the same name. (This is no guarantee, of
course, that files having the same name have the same content, but ignore
that here.) Another way in which software can share code is by having
one application rely on the expected presence of other software. This may
be as basic as relying on the printer drivers provided with Windows in
your word processing application. We could think of these as software externalities.
For ease of discussion, label the first version of sharing the common component case, the second the expected component case, and start
with the first. Installation—and deinstallation, as we need to consider both
of these—creates the risk of corruption if the common component is actually shared by the two packages. Package 1 is added to the system; package 2 is added thereafter. If both packages use precisely the same version
of the shared component and look to the same file path for the component, we have avoided some basic problems. If not, we may overwrite an
old component with a new component (or vice versa) and break one of
the packages. Deinstallation creates similar issues: If package 2 uninstalls
the common component, package 1 won’t work. In the software business,
this is referred to as “DLL hell,” as many of the relevant files are stored in
files known as dynamic link libraries (DLLs). In the expected component
case, again, the software may not work at all and certainly won’t work as
planned if the expected component is missing. You can write words on the
screen but you can’t print, if the printer drivers that the word processor
looks for are missing.
In both of these cases, we have a natural alternative: have each application bring all of its components with it. Indeed, this has been a common practice on the Unix platform.5 This of course would increase the
size of each application, quite dramatically in some cases. It also poses interesting licensing questions. For example, suppose that Microsoft licensed
Windows to every application developer who wanted to rely on the Windows infrastructure for its applications. Windows and the application
would be distributed together, thereby ensuring the necessary OS for running the application. This poses pricing problems. Do I have to rebuy the
OS with each application? Should the application test for the presence of
5

See Rick Anderson, The End of DLL Hell, January, 2000 (available at
http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/enus/dnw2k/html/dlldanger1.asp)
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the OS already, and not charge you for the OS if you already have it?
How do we make that system work when software is distributed on CDs
and floppies and not over the Internet?
A. Minimizing the Operating System and the Windows Installer
Try a thought experiment: Suppose we wanted to minimize the operating
system. How far could we shrink and what would be the consequences of
doing this?6 We can get a handle on this by delving into an obscure piece
of Windows 2000, a tool called the Windows Installer (WI). The Windows Installer implements key related concepts—just-in-time software,
installation on demand and “advertisement”—which in turn help to make
clear what the minimalist operating system might look like.7
As you might guess, absent perverse naming, the Windows Installer would be a tool for installing software, and, of course, it is. It establishes a unified framework for installation—and deinstallation—of new
software on a computer running the Windows 2000 operating system.
One of the key issues in adding and removing software is the management of shared software. Software sharing, of course, in some sense defines the software business. When we think of an operating system as
serving as a platform for a large number of application programs, we mean
that the applications share that operating system. Each application need
not come with its own operating system but instead can rely on the existence of certain basic functionalities from the OS.
WI creates new possibilities in installation. The standard binary
choice—the component is installed or it isn’t installed—is replaced with a
richer structure that allows installation of software as and when needed.
Features are “advertised,” meaning that the software displays the feature
in question as available for use, but the actual software to implement the
feature is not already installed. When the user tries to use the feature, the
installer obtains the software, usually by asking the user to insert an origi-

6

Operating system theorists might object that we should focus on the microkernel when
looking for the smallest element of an OS, though I gather this is a contested issue. See,
e.g., William Stallings, Operating Systems 172-78 (4th ed. 2001); Andrew S. Tanenbaum, Modern Operating Systems 62 (2nd ed. 2001). I intend the OS notion in the
text to be less precise and more conceptual, I hope without doing serious damage to language.
7 This discussion is based on Microsoft’s white paper “The Windows Installer Service,”
(available
at
http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/techinfo/howitworks/management/installer.as
p).
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nal Windows 2000 CD—and loads it at that point. This is installation on
demand (IOD) or just-in-time software.
IOD works at the feature level. For example, I recently received an
email from an Israeli student, which, in turn, used a Hebrew font. It
wasn’t already on my machine, but the computer realized that, and asked
me to load it. Advertising could work at the application level itself, so that
when I first try to use an application, say PowerPoint, the entire application is loaded.
In this framework, we can naturally distinguish advertising (or
visibility), which relates to whether a particular feature is visible to the
user, and presence, which relates to whether or not software has been installed on the computer or is directly available for use across a network.
Software can be visible without being present, indeed, that is the core idea
of installation on demand. Software could also be present without being
visible: an end-user would not see how to invoke the software directly but
a software developer could rely on the presence of the software for sharing
when designing complementary software. We should also distinguish between presence and ownership: software could be installed but unowned;
first use of the software might trigger a request for payment to be made
across the network.
We can now define the minimalist operating system. It has no
functionality other than advertising features and applications. It also will
maintain a database of the locations of advertised software. You want to
browse the Internet? You click on the browser icon on the desktop, and
install a browser (which browser?). You want help understanding the
desktop, go to the advertised help feature, which in turn will require the
loading of content and a display engine. Email? Word processing? It all
operates the same way. The minimalist operating system does little more
than provide access points to features and applications and uses the Windows Installer to manage the installation on a demand basis.
B. OEMs and OS Fragmentation
We should examine how software was distributed in the pre-network era.
Software was installed by a computer seller—an original equipment
manufacturer or OEM in the trade—at the time of the purchase of a new
computer, and by end-users off of CDs and floppies when new software
was purchased. OEMs dealt directly with software vendors, such as Microsoft and others. Microsoft defends its decisions regarding IE from the
broad position that software developers, not courts, need to be in charge of
innovation. Microsoft also argues more narrowly that by bundling together software in the operating system and insisting that each user have
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the same platform, it creates standards that redound to the benefit of all
consumers. Software developers, at least as a group, rely on the presence
of all of the components of the operating system in developing their
applications. Losing a component means breaking an application.
Allowing OEMs to install some pieces of the OS and excluded others will
result in a “fragmented” installed base for the operating system. With a
fragmented OS—with multiple flavors—application developers must
create multiple versions of their application or ignore groups of potential
users. Examine this concern in the framework of our two basic software
sharing scenarios: common components and expected components. Consumers do not want to pay twice for the same piece of software. In the
common component case—if managed correctly—the consumer needs
only one copy of the component and does want to pay two software
houses for it. We now need to coordinate distribution of the single copy of
the component. With an extremely fined-grained setup for distributing
software, we could do this in a number of ways. All software is installed
over the network. When the consumer purchases software package A, the
installer searches the consumer’s computer to see if any components required for the package are already installed. Finding none, a full installation is done for package A and the full price is charged for the software.
Time passes and the consumer seeks to buy software package B. The installer searches for common components and finds the components that
overlap between A and B. Package B is installed, but only the new components, and the price charged for the software reflects the fact that the
common components were not sold in the second installation.
This requires an enormous amount of coordination. In the prenetwork era—pre-Internet really—there was no way to engage in this sort
of real-time coordination of distribution and payment. Software was sold
on CDs and the price for that software was paid in exchange for and at
the time of the physical transfers of the CD. Networked coordination of
the sort possible in the network software distribution model was difficult.
It would have been possible to use a lock and key system, requiring a telephone call and payment to purchase a code to unlock the software, but this
is somewhat clunky. Instead, we needed to rely on centralized coordination of the hub-and-spoke variety with Windows at the hub. We avoided
multiple purchases of the same software by assigning the sale of common
components to the central hub. These components were distributed as
part of the operating system, so as to facilitate coordination, rather than as
somehow being an inherently necessary part of the OS.
In the pre-Internet era, we could think of OEMs as playing the
key role in software coordination. In the abstract, OEMs could treat Win-
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dows as an input, and they could subtract at will, and then add other software. In the pre-network era, this would have worked poorly. Software
was distributed on floppies or CDs, and not over the network. If a software developer anticipated that software would be present on the consumer’s machine, the developer would not bundle that software with its
software. When that supposition turned out to be wrong, the new software would crash. Absent a network connection, there would be no way
to add that component on an as-needed basis. In that world, fragmentation of the OS is a serious concern.
We have been discussing the common component case with sharing between peer applications. The expected component case is more hierarchical, where the second piece of software is more fundamentally dependent on the first. In the expected component case, if that component is
missing, WI just reaches out to get the necessary component. If an OEM
hasn’t installed the component that the application needs, the WI solves
that problem by adding the component as needed. Again, with always-on
networks, this is easy to solve. The rise of the ubiquitous network changes
the costs of coordination dramatically. Networked component sharing becomes possible in a technical sense, and the real question relates to the
cost of coordinating the markets in these transactions.
It is even easy to address with standalone computers, so long as the
Windows CD distributed with the computer contains the missing component, even if the OEM chose not to install it originally. Of course, if we
think of the OEM as buying some subset of the Windows OS and the
end-user receiving only that subset on the CD, we then have a problem.
The end-user will need to enter into a separate transaction with Microsoft
to buy the needed component, and, again, pre-network, that transaction is
quite expensive. Microsoft would need to prepare a missing components
CD for each OEM, and arrange to distribute those through retailers.
The alternative is that the Windows CD contains all of the components, even if OEMs can choose to make visible only a subset of that
Windows functionality. IOD would then add missing functionality on as
needed basis as an application looked for that functionality. Of course in
that framework, OEMs would seek to pay for as little of Windows as possible, given that consumers would receive the entire package anyway.
III. Monopoly Maintenance and the Limits of Centralized Coordination
of Software Sharing
In the pre-network era, the OS emerges naturally as the key device for
implementing software sharing coordination. Microsoft policed that coor-
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dination by insisting on full availability of Windows. That of course gave
Microsoft enormous power, as Windows itself emerged as the dominant
vehicle for software distribution. In the pre-network period, the need for
centralized coordination gave Microsoft a bottleneck power, the ability to
include and at least partially exclude simply through inclusion or exclusion
from Windows.
Obviously, as the central coordinator, Microsoft could just include
IE with Windows, which in turn gives rise to the tying claim in the case.
But Microsoft went beyond this by giving others access to Windows in an
effort to influence their use of Navigator. Microsoft also used its control
over software design to disadvantage Netscape. This is what drives the
monopoly maintenance claim in the case. Microsoft used its control over
access to Windows not merely to continue to coordinate software sharing
but to affirmatively prevent Netscape from succeeding. The irony here is
that inclusion of IE into Windows might have sufficed to protect the applications barrier to entry as conceived of in the case, and the contractual
efforts aimed directly at Netscape were probably overkill.
The standard approach to monopolization under Sec. 2 of the
Sherman Act was set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v. Grinnell Corp.: “The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has
two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”8 The appeals court upheld “in
its entirety” the lower court’s conclusion that Microsoft exercised monopoly power in the market for Intel-compatible computers.9
Monopoly in hand, the monopoly maintenance claim is straightforward and turns on Microsoft’s role as centralized coordinator. The
maintenance claim itself rested on four separate allegations: (1) contractual dealings with a blizzard of abbreviations—OEMs, IAPs, ICPs and
ISVs—and those with Apple and Intel; (2) integration of IE and Windows; (3) efforts to subvert Java; and (4) Microsoft’s course of conduct as a
whole.10 The appeals court rejected the latter claim as insufficiently developed,11 but upheld, in whole or in part, the lower court’s ruling on the
other three allegations.
8

384 U.S. 563, 570-571 (1966). See also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Co., 472 U.S. 585, 596 n. 19 (1985).
9

Opinion at 15.

10

Opinion at 25-26.

11

Opinion at 58-59.
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A. Contractual Dealings
The appeals court in the main upheld the lower court’s analysis of the
contracts:
o AGREEMENTS WITH OEMS. Microsoft barred OEMs from
changing desktop icons or folders or the menu entries under the
“Start” Menu. Microsoft also did not allow the OEMs to alter the
sequence of screens viewed when the computer booted initially,
nor did it allow the OEMs to substitute another interface shell for
Windows itself (here thinking of Windows, as it was originally, as
an overlay for DOS). The appeals court found each of these restrictions, save for the last, anticompetitive without any countervailing justification. For example, Microsoft’s insistence that the
icon for Internet Explorer be visible on the desktop made it less
likely that OEMs would install Navigator as well, since, as the
lower court found and Microsoft did not successfully challenge on
appeal, two icons might create consumer confusion, and confused
consumers call their OEMs first. Alterations in the boot sequence
might make it possible for OEMs to promote rival browsers. In
separating icon removal or alteration of the boot sequence from
wholesale replacement of the Windows shell, the appeals court
emphasized that the latter made substantial alterations to Microsoft’s copyrighted work, while the former made only minor
changes.
o AGREEMENTS WITH IAPS. The court of appeals blessed Microsoft’s efforts to attract Internet access providers (IAPs) to IE by
giving it and the Internet Explorer Access Kit to them gratis and
by paying IAPs for getting their users to adopt IE. These agreements became anticompetitive when they included direct limits on
loading Navigator, as this, in the view of the court, partially foreclosed one of the two key modes of distributing browser software.
Microsoft’s failure to offer a procompetitive justification for these
limits sealed its fate.
o DEALS WITH ICPS AND ISVS. The court of appeals rejected liability for Microsoft’s deals with Internet content providers (ICPs), as
these agreements were not shown to have had a substantial effect
upon competition. The court reached a contrary conclusion for
Microsoft’s dealings with independent software vendors (ISVs).
Microsoft had agreed to give preferential access to early versions of
Windows 98 and the next version of Windows NT to the ISVs in
exchange for an agreement to use Internet Explorer as the default
software for HTML-based materials. The lower court concluded
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that these agreements foreclosed Netscape from an important
channel for distributing Navigator, and the appeals court found
this to show a prima facie case of monopoly maintenance, and
again Microsoft offered a minimal procompetitive justification.
o DEAL WITH APPLE. The appeals court affirmed the lower court’s
finding the Microsoft had behaved anti-competitively in threatening to cancel the Mac version of Office if Apple did not bundle IE
with Mac OS and make it the default browser.
o DEALS RELATING TO JAVA. The court of appeals reversed the
lower court’s ruling that Microsoft acted illegally in creating an incompatible version of the Java virtual machine (JVM) in competition with Sun’s version of the JVM. Incompatibility alone did not
violate the Sherman Act, and the court understood the competitive
benefits of having multiple versions of the JVM. This is true even
if Microsoft’s strategic reason for incompatibility was to fragment
the Java market. But the court of appeals upheld lower court rulings on deception in the marketing of Microsoft’s Java authoring
software; on de facto exclusivity in certain agreements for the distribution of Navigator, which in turn blocked the distribution of
Sun’s JVM; and on Microsoft’s anticompetitive threats to Intel on
a possible Intel JVM.
As the court of appeals concluded, Microsoft cut deals with a variety of industry players to give them special access to Windows in exchange
for their support of IE and limitations on their use of Navigator. In doing
so, Microsoft stepped beyond its assigned role of hub, both by including
software in Windows for reasons that had little to do with consumer satisfaction and by using its control over Windows to tilt the competitive playing field against Netscape.
Microsoft repeatedly incorporated new features into Windows that
allowed it offer special placement to other companies. Doing so takes the
idea of “advertising” discussed above in connection with the Windows Installer and applies it quite literally to the Windows desktop. Two features,
the online service providers folder and the Channel Bar, are of particular
note. The Windows desktop advertised, actually quite literally, Internet
service providers, including America Online. The Channel Bar advertised
content providers. It was precisely the ability to advertise on the Windows
desktop that created leverage for Microsoft in its effort to attract users to
Internet Explorer away from Netscape Navigator.
In these cases, Microsoft was able to use its control over Windows
to create scarcity and then to use that scarcity as a lever against Netscape.
Start with scarcity. To understand Microsoft’s incentives, it is useful to
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keep in mind an example known as the card game.12 Contrast two versions. In the first, one person holds five black cards, while five other individuals each hold one red card. Each successful pairing of a black and red
card is worth $100, and that value can be split in whatever fashion agreed
to by the cardholders. We can’t be sure what will happen here, but we
might guess that we would get five matches, and roughly a 50/50 split of
the value. The black card monopolist would get $250 and each red card
holder would get $50, for a total of $250 going to the red card holders.
Now suppose that the black card holder destroyed one black card.
How would this change the outcome? It is clear that society is worse off.
We can now only get four matches for a total of $400 in value. Nonetheless, our black card monopolist may do better. How? One holder of a red
card is going to get left out. Imagine that tentative deals have been struck
with four red card holders with a 50/50 division. The red card holder on
the sidelines has every incentive to jump in and offer a different split, say
60/40, to at least get something from his red card. Of course that would
just exclude a different red card holder, who in turn would offer a better
deal to the black card monopolist. When black cards are scarce, the black
card monopolist has enormous bargaining power through its ability to play
one red card holder off against another. This bargaining power was created by creating artificial scarcity. The very act of making the overall pie
smaller gives a bigger piece to the monopolist.
This is artificial scarcity at work. It would have been easy enough
to have just put the ten largest ISPs into the online folder with appropriate
code to sign up with the ISPs. Hard disk space isn’t at a premium. Getting
the code right would have been some work, though the ISPs would certainly have been delighted to bear the costs. Customers would have had
many choices highlighted for them in a straightforward way. But this
would not have worked in Microsoft’s interests. Microsoft would not have
been able to extract a commitment from AOL regarding support for IE.
Microsoft took exactly the same line with AT&T when it was seeking inclusion in the online folders.13
Look at the case of AOL in more detail. David Colburn, Senior
Vice President for Business Affairs of America Online, testified that AOL
feared that its business would be substantially undercut by the bundling of
Microsoft’s new online service, MSN, with Windows 95. Control over

12

For more on the card game, see Adam M. Brandenburger and Barry J. Nalebuff, Coopetition 41-43 (1996).
13

See United States v. Microsoft Trial Transcript, October 19, 1998 A.M. Session, 7375 (available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/trial/transcripts/oct98/1019a.doc).

Randal C. Picker, Pursuing a Remedy in Microsoft

15

Windows gives Microsoft control over the best possible distribution channel for software, plus Microsoft can give that software prominent placement by sticking an icon for it on the Windows desktop.
AOL desperately wanted something to match this distribution and
placement. It had built its business through “carpet bombing,” that is, mass
distribution of AOL floppies and CDs, where only 1-2% of those receiving the CDs would ever become AOL customers (how many of these
have you thrown out?).14 Microsoft offered an unmatchable inducement
to adopt Microsoft’s Internet browser and to reject that of Netscape:
placement of an AOL icon in an “online services” folder on the Windows
desktop and distribution with Windows of the code required to sign up
with AOL. As a result, on March 12, 1996, Microsoft and AOL signed
an agreement in which AOL agreed to, in Colburn’s words, “virtual exclusivity in favor of Internet Explorer on AOL.”15 AOL could ship a browser
other than Internet Explorer only when required to do so by a third party,
and after AOL had taken all “reasonable efforts” to induce the third party
to use Internet Explorer, plus there was an absolute cap that non-Internet
Explorer shipments were limited to less than 15% of AOL’s total browser
shipments.
Microsoft can and does manipulate this scarcity. The Online Services folder was made less important with the addition of the Internet
Connection Wizard and the Active Desktop Channel Bar.16 This gave
Microsoft a chance to play the card game again, and it once again extracted promises from AOL to benefit Internet Explorer. AOL and Microsoft executed the Active Desktop Marketing, Promotion and Distribution Agreement in September, 1997, which barred AOL from promoting
Netscape within the AOL websites and from compensating Netscape for
promoting AOL content.17
This should make clear why the government succeeded in persuading the District Court that Microsoft had violated Sec. 2 of the
Sherman Act by maintaining its monopoly. Microsoft was able to distort
its competition with Netscape by its role as hub by adding content to
Windows solely for the purpose of buying allegiance. This is not competition on the merits, as it privileges the position of the central coordinator.
14

See Direct Testimony of Jim Barksdale
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1900/1999.htm).
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Some of these restrictions might have been justified on a procompetitive basis given the tricky incentive issues associated with distribution agreements among a producer and its various agents—and we should
think of the alphabet entities in those terms. These are principal-agent
relationships. Microsoft, the principal, engages the OEM or IAP, as
agent, to distribute its software. Antitrust law recognizes that there is no
simple way to characterize vertical relationships and so a rule of reason
analysis applies.18 In this particular situation, we have two principals—
Netscape and Microsoft—negotiating with the same group of agents.
Vigorous competition between the two principals could result in a rough
split of the agents, with each principal entering into exclusive agency
agreements with ten agents. The real issue is the value of exclusive agency
relative to the value of shared agency. Microsoft didn’t really develop this
issue, hence the willingness of the D.C. Circuit to accept the lower court’s
findings.19
Other restrictions are more difficult to characterize in a procompetitive fashion. Preferential access to early versions of Windows betas, for example, is probably about maximizing Microsoft’s leverage of that
information by creating a sense of advantage and exclusivity from the special access. This is the Studio 54 approach to information disclosure: without have-nots standing on the outside clamoring to get in, those on the
inside feel they have obtained nothing special and of course would be willing to pay nothing for it. Again, this could be a way of disciplining an
agent—if all get the carrot there is no reason to work for it—but Microsoft didn’t make this case out and nothing, other than its sense of selfinterest, prevented Microsoft from distributing these betas to all ISVs.
Microsoft emphasizes that it has dropped many, if not all, of these
contractual limitations long before the ruling.20 That said it would be a
mistake to treat these restrictions as having been unimportant or to infer
that from Microsoft’s willingness to drop them. We must remember that
at the point where Microsoft most faced a competitive threat to its operating system monopoly—when Netscape Navigator held a dominant market
share and regardless of whether this threat was real or just Microsoftimagined—Microsoft used its monopoly power over Windows to tilt the
competitive process against Netscape. Having succeeded in preserving that
18

Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).

19

For additional discussion, see Benjamin Klein, The Microsoft Case: What Can a
Dominant Firm Do to Defend Its Market Position?, 15 J. Econ. Perspectives 45
(Spring, 2001).
20

See Comments of Bill Gates at June 28, 2001 Press Conference (available at
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/trial/jun01/06-28newsconftrans.asp).
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monopoly by building up Explorer, the contract limits became much less
important.
B. Design Monopoly Maintenance
The claim of monopoly maintenance through the integration of IE and
Windows is quite different. This goes directly to the question of how the
software is designed. The claim itself is conceptually straightforward: If
Microsoft designs software to harm competition and preserve its Windows
monopoly and not to make better software for consumers, it has engaged
in monopoly maintenance. The difficulty, of course, is in separating beneficial and anticompetitive designs, and the difficulty of doing so has made
courts, in the word of the D.C. Circuit, “properly very skeptical” about
sorting through product design changes. The lower court focused on three
particular acts of alleged design monopoly maintenance: (1) the exclusion
of IE from the Add/Remove programs utility; (2) the commingling of
code for the browser and other parts of the operating system; and (3) the
use of IE as the browser in certain situations, even when another browser
had been specified as the default. The court of appeals upheld (1) and (2)
and reversed on (3).
Consider each of these in turn. The inclusion of IE in the
Add/Remove utility facilitates consumer choice. Large-scale corporate users who want to deny their employees the ability to surf the Internet can
do so easily by eliminating all browsers. Other large users who prefer
Navigator and want to eliminate the costs of supporting dual browsers can
swap in Navigator for IE. The inability to remove IE created the same
cost-entry barrier for Navigator as was created by the contractual icon restrictions, as part of a raising rivals’ cost strategy. In both cases, the presence of IE meant that OEMs would have to support IE, and this made it
less likely that they would also install and support Navigator. We can with
some ease articulate the consumer benefits that would have obtained from
inclusion of IE in Add/Remove as well as the competitive harms that resulted from the failure to do so.
But the nature of the after-the-fact looks at product design means
we have, with the benefit of hindsight, zoomed in on the single design
decision we think mattered. Before the fact, what should have limited the
scope of the Add/Remove obligation? This is a question of how much the
software should be able to be customized by end-users. In buzzwords, this
is about the extent of mass customization. There is no simple answer to
this question, but we can say that we want software houses to make design
decisions on the merits, not on the competitive consequences. The evidence suggests that it was precisely the fact that Microsoft knew which
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features mattered for competition—the browser and not printer drivers—
that led it to eliminate Add/Remove for IE.
As to the consumer confusion issue, the actual presence of IE—
meaning its pre-installation on the computer even if in a form invisible to
the end-user—is probably unimportant—although the district court did
suggest that hard disk space was wasted. Visibility is what matters as this is
what triggers the support cost concern, which in turn made it more difficult to get Navigator installed. This suggests that the fix here is less one
about design itself and much more about which features are advertised or
made visible. Eliminate advertising of IE—no icon on the desktop or in
the Quick Launch Toolbar (the little bar at the bottom with the IE
icon)—and we take a big step towards solving the support problem.21 This
is precisely what Microsoft accomplished in its July 11, 2001 announcement that OEMs would now have the option to remove icons for IE from
the desktop and that IE would be restored to the Add/Remove function.22
What problems would that leave? Consider the second design issue, the commingling of code for the browser and the operating system.
The appeals court found that the lower court evidence was mixed on
whether Microsoft had commingled to impair competition, a result
Microsoft has challenged in its petition for rehearing. Nonetheless, this
misses the bigger picture. Consumers have no direct stake in how these
files are organized. Yes, lumping them together may mean we can’t delete
parts of the file, but this is barely even small potatoes given the growth of
disk space. So the direct benefits of deletion are small, and controlling
visibility is a better instrument for solving these issues than trying to control directly the assignment of code to particular files.23
There is a second issue here though, one addressed somewhat
obliquely by the court of appeals but more squarely in the lower court. The
visibility solution focuses on the appeals court’s view of the strategic harm
of integrating the browser, namely that it directly raised the cost of install21

Microsoft makes this point in its petition for rehearing. See Microsoft Corporation’s
Petition for Rehearing 2 (filed with the D.C. Circuit on July 18, 2001).
22

See Microsoft Press Release of July 11, 2001 (available at
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2001/Jul01/07-11OEMFlexibilityPR.asp).
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Do note in this regard that the claim in the case is not that the presence of the IE code
directly impaired the operation of Navigator. There was some suggestion of this. For
example, in Finding of Fact ¶ 160, Brad Chase of Microsoft stated that “[w]e will bind
the shell to the Internet Explorer, so that running any other browser is a jolting experience.” The claim is one of strategic impairment, not technical impairment. The visibility
remedy minimizes the strategic impact of the design decision but would do nothing if
there were a direct technical problem.
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ing a second browser. Making it possible for IE to be invisible, even if
present, would solve the support cost problem. It would leave in place
though a second strategic problem. We need to distinguish the strategic
consequences of visibility and presence. So far we have focused on visibility. The mere presence of IE, for “free” as it were—more precisely, included with the OS at no separate marginal price—means that Microsoft
can rely on it for various features, such as the Windows Help system and
Windows Update, and outside developers can rely on its existence as they
create their products. That is useful—this is precisely Microsoft’s point
about providing a common ubiquitous infrastructure—but this also may
mean that Netscape would be deprived of a chunk of users it would otherwise get. Absent a large enough user base, the economies of scale of
software may foreclose Netscape from successfully developing its products,24 plus developers may continue to focus on developing for Windows
directly if the browser market is fragmented.25
In the extreme case, the OS monopolist might try to foreclose a related product completely. Try a simple situation to see this.26 Users have
no interest in the operating system per se. Users just want to surf the web.
One-third of the users would prefer to do so using IE, one-third using
Netscape, and one-third are indifferent between the two. Each browser
runs on top of the operating system, so the OS is required to run the
browser. There is a fixed cost of $100 to build the operating system and of
$25 to build each browser. We have 150 consumers, 50 who value browsing with Netscape at $2, and with IE at $0, 50 with contrary preferences;
and 50 who value browsing at $2 with either browser. (No value is attached to just having the operating system.)
What would an all-powerful social planner do? It obviously makes
no sense to build just the OS, as that would cost $100 and create no value.
24

For detailed development, see Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 Amer. Econ. Rev. 837 (1990); Michael D. Whinston, Exclusivity and Tying in
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She could build the OS and one browser at a cost of $125, and this would
result in value of $200, for a net gain of $75. She also could build the OS
and both browsers at a cost of $150 for a value of $300, and a net gain of
$150. She should obviously do the latter.
How should we price this? What price should we charge for the
OS and for each of the browsers? In this example, with three types of
identical consumers, it really doesn’t matter. Suppose that the social planner just wanted to recover fixed costs and leave the consumer surplus to
the consumers. She could price the operating system at $1 and give away
both browsers. She could give away the OS and charge $1 for each
browser. She could do a hundred other variations.
It is clear what an OS monopolist would do. He would set the
price of the OS at $1.66. This would permit the monopolist to fully extract
all of the consumer surplus while just leaving enough value for the
browser producers to recover their fixed costs. They, in turn, would charge
$.33 for the browser. The OS monopolist would get revenues of $250,
each browser company of $25. Obviously, if the OS company is the first
browser company, its total revenues would be $275 against costs of $125
for profits of $150.27
Now change this slightly. Imagine this scenario as being played
out period after period, where we have new consumers each period, but
the same products, and, to make matters easy, make it certain that in the
second period the browser would emerge as a competitor to the operating
system. Assume if that happens that competition erupts such that all of the
consumer surplus goes to consumers, and there are no profits going forward for the software producers.
How would this change the outcome for our social planner? Not at
all: still build the OS and both browsers and set charges to cover costs. But
our monopolist would face a different choice. The monopolist could proceed as before and would get profits of $150 in the first round and no
profits thereafter. Alternatively, the monopolist could seek to prevent entry by the second browser. The monopolist could sell the operating system
for $2 and give away the browser or could bundle the two together and
sell at $2. These are equivalent here.
At that price the monopolist sells 100 copies of the OS and the
browser: 50 of each to the devotees of its browser, 50 to the different. To27

This could be seen as a little casual. Once the fixed costs are spent, software in hand,
we could easily expect Bertrand price competition to push browser software prices to
zero. The analysis in the text assumes that the entry and pricing decisions are just one
decision.
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tal revenues are $200 against costs of $125, for profits, in the first round,
of $75. In the second round, the monopolist either gets profits of $75
again, if we think of the fixed costs as being incurred in each period, or
profits of $200, if not. The monopolist will seek to deter entry if $150 now
is less than the present value of the stream of profits without the entry of
the second browser company. In the first version of this hypothetical, the
OS monopolist wants both browsers produced, as this increases sales of
the OS. In the second version, assuming modest rates of interest for present value calculations, the monopolist will deter entry of the second
browser to prevent losing the original operating systems monopoly.
That leaves the third design issue. The appeals court overturned
the finding below that Microsoft engaged in monopoly maintenance in
overriding, in some circumstances, the consumer’s default choice of
browser and instead invoking IE. Microsoft offered a defense of this practice, and the appeals court saw the plaintiffs as offering no response, hence
the Microsoft victory. In some ways, the court was too deferential to Microsoft’s analysis. Microsoft argued that IE had to be invoked when consumers used the Windows 98 Help System or Windows Update, as both
relied on ActiveX controls not supported by Navigator and on Microsoft’s
Channel Definition Format, also not supported by Navigator. Even if all
true, we have design decisions layered on design decisions. If we knew
that Microsoft uses ActiveX controls in the help system precisely because
they were not supported by Navigator, this would make the need for IE
pretextual. This is difficult to evaluate without more information.
We need a bottom line on design monopoly maintenance. It is
easy to state the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion: “[a]ccordingly, we hold that
Microsoft’s exclusion of IE from the Add/Remove Programs utility and its
commingling of browser and operating system code constitute exclusionary conduct in violation of § 2.”28 It is less clear what this means. Does this
mean that if Microsoft distributes a feature in or with Windows for which
there is a competitor—instant messaging, for example—Microsoft engages in illegal monopoly maintenance by making it less likely that the
competitor’s software will be installed?
Most narrowly, on the court’s analysis, we should limit this rule to
features that are possible (likely?) competitors to the OS and to visibility
and not mere presence. This tracks the court’s analysis in that the browser
was seen as a potential competitor to the OS by Microsoft, and hence its
anti-competitive design decisions were clearly about maintaining the OS
monopoly. The focus on visibility and not just presence matches the view
28
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that the strategic harm here was the way in which support costs were
raised if consumers face the choice of using two different browsers. Even
with the narrow rule, we have the difficult problem of identifying potential
competitors to the OS. Instant messaging? The RealNetworks media
player?
C. Causation and Monopoly Maintenance
That said, there is little reason to think that this monopoly maintenance
actually mattered, at least on the government’s theory of the case. The
court of appeals acknowledged that the causation issues here were tricky,
but saw the issue as going to remedy, not liability.29 The government saw
Microsoft as seeking to protect the “applications barrier to entry,” meaning the software ecosystem organized around Windows. Had Netscape
succeeded in establishing a parallel presence, a new ecosystem might have
emerged around it. This misses the mark in two ways. First, Microsoft almost certainly would have succeeded in preserving its ecosystem simply by
adding IE to Windows. Fragmentation of the browser market, not monopolization of it, was all that was required.30 Second, in some more fundamental sense, Microsoft was losing by winning. A new ecosystem did
emerge, the World Wide Web, and that has supplanted the primacy of
Windows, both as a focal point of attention and as a means of distributing
software. Placement on the Windows desktop may still be the premier location in computer real estate, but it is now just one of many valuable
locations in a consumer’s virtual space.
And the paramount role of the Windows CD and desktop as the
device for distributing software has substantially declined in the networked
world. As even Judge Jackson realized in rejecting the claim that Microsoft had engaged in illegal exclusive dealing, Netscape was able to distribute tens of millions of copies of Navigator, many over the Internet. Indeed, ironically, the distribution of Internet Explorer itself made it easier
for consumers to get Navigator over the net.

29
30

Opinion at 59-62.

That said, Microsoft itself may not have believed this to be true. As the lower court
found, see Finding of Fact ¶ 160, Microsoft moved to integrating IE and Windows precisely because it feared that the contractual restrictions might not be enough. We have
less direct evidence on whether Microsoft would have thought that integrating IE with
Windows would have sufficed.
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IV. Tying
The D.C. Circuit reversed the lower court on the claim that Microsoft
tied Internet Explorer to Windows in violation of Sec. 1 of the Sherman
Act. The lower court had found a per se violation, but the D.C. Circuit
remanded for a rule of reason inquiry into the alleged tie. In doing so, the
court recognized the “poor fit” of applying traditional tying doctrine to
software markets. Standard antitrust tying analysis requires that we have
two goods. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde; Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States.31 Without two goods, by definition, there can
be no tying of one good to a second good. Hence, the focus on integration
and separation of software in the District Court and in the D.C. Circuit’s
Microsoft II.32
This discussion has little meaning in this context, given the malleability of software design.33 Good software design strives for modularity.
Breaking up code into discrete chunks facilitates team creation of software
and maximizes re-use of software. By setting out a piece of code, other
software developers need not recreate functions in application after application but instead can call and use distinct modules. In that framework, an
“integrated” piece of software is poorly-designed software: it looks to no
other software for functions and sets forth no functions that other software
can access. It does not share. In contrast, fully-unintegrated software
shares well: it takes full advantage of preexisting software modules and
creates modules available to other software. It would be perverse to tilt our
antitrust tying analysis in a fashion that pushed towards poorly-designed
software.
A. Many Free Goods and Traditional Tying Doctrine
How should we evaluate tying in this context? Consider the traditional
formulation of the harms of tying as set forth by the D.C. Circuit:
Direct competition on the merits of the tied product is
foreclosed when the tying product either is sold only in
a bundle with the tied product or, though offered separately, is sold at a bundled price, so that the buyer pays
the same price whether he takes the tied product or not.
31
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In both cases, a consumer buying the tying product becomes entitled to the tied product; he will therefore
likely be unwilling to buy a competitor’s version of the
tied product even if, making his own price/quality assessment, that is what he would prefer.34
We immediately encounter a problem when we apply this to software markets: we see lots of free stuff and tying theory doesn’t handle that
very well. So, for example, is Adobe’s free Acrobat Reader tied to Windows? You could answer this in a number of ways. Yes, it is a free, thirdparty complement to Windows, but it is not specific to Windows as Adobe
makes free versions for a variety of platforms, including Macintosh, Palm
and Linux. Suppose Adobe made only a Windows version, would that
change the analysis? We usually think of the tie as being made by one
company, and not arising through the choice of a third party, so this
doesn’t square with the traditional doctrine at all.
Now the question: if free software—or more precisely, a two-piece
pricing strategy, with a single company selling a mix of free and for-a-fee
software—is a common software strategy, even in markets we believe to
be competitive, does this preclude applying tying law to software markets?
Or should we say that a company with monopoly power in one market is
barred from giving away free software in a second market, even though
other companies in that market will give away the software as well?
As we know from the case itself, this is not a fanciful scenario.
Netscape gave away versions of Navigator to some individuals, though it
tried and succeeded in making sales to corporations. Netscape was looking
to making the browsing market drive sales in the server market, just as
Adobe gives away its reader to sell the authoring software. In contrast,
Microsoft was focused on the relationship between the browser market
and the operating systems market. As Judge Jackson found, Microsoft’s
entry into the browser market created competition and thereby pushed
down prices to the benefit of consumers. Moreover, the central concern of
tying—that the consumer doesn’t use the preferred second good—
vanishes if the second good is free as well. This is free vs. free competition,
and tying doctrine doesn’t get that.
A rule that says that a company with monopoly power in one software market cannot give away free software in a second market will help
to push up prices making consumers worse off. This could be a bizarre
double-whammy. The browser market competition linked competition in
two markets that might otherwise have been separated, operating systems
34
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and server software. If Netscape had obtained monopoly power in the
server software market, the anti-free software tying rule would have
barred both Microsoft and Netscape from distributing free browsing software.
B. Tying as Mandatory Software Coordination
We should focus instead on software coordination. Impermissible tying
occurs when an entity with market power attempts to take over coordination of software sharing on a mandatory basis in a context where it should
not do so and need not do so. That was a little vague, so consider again
coordination in the pre-network and post-network worlds. In the prenetwork world, most if not all shared software needed to be provided by
the centralized hub. The inability to distribute across a network as needed
and to pay for that software at the same time created a real pressure to
centralize in the OS and distribute that software upfront. In contrast, in
the networked world, applications can rely on whatever components they
choose to, and the Windows Installer reaches out to get them as needed.
The transaction can take place in real time. Hence, almost no bundling is
required. Software can be purchased on an as-needed basis. Impermissible
tying then emerges as an attempt to impose mandatory centralized coordination where it has ceased to be required.
What does this say about Microsoft’s decision to include IE in
Windows? We have reached the end of the line, the transition point between the pre and the post. Incorporating IE was fully consistent with
Microsoft’s past role as central coordinator of shared software, but at the
same time, marks the end of the need for Microsoft to play a unique role
in coordinating software. The D.C. Circuit noted that bundling has virtues in reducing distribution and consumer transactions costs and in facilitating shared libraries.35 Precisely so, but the rise of the network changes
the mechanism for doing this. Pre-network, Microsoft did this through
Windows; now the always-on network makes it possible to decentralize
this coordination.
The court of appeals paid too little attention to this idea in rightly
abandoning the per se condemnation of tying by the lower court. The
D.C. Circuit pushes for a rule for reason analysis that respects “potentially
innovative technological integration.”36 The court focused on precisely the
right issues regarding software sharing and the issues of coordination:
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For example, the bundling of a browser with OSs enables an independent software developer to count on
the presence of the browser’s APIs, if any, on its own
package and thus to omit them from its own package.
… It is true that software developers can bundle the
browser APIs they need with their own products … but
that may force consumers to pay twice for the same
API if it is bundled with two different software programs. It is also true that OEMs can include APIs with
the computers they sell, …, but diffusion of uniform
APIs by that route may be inferior. First, many OEMs
serve special subsets of Windows consumers, such as
home or corporate or academic users. If just one of
these OEMs decides not to bundle an API because it
does not benefit enough of its clients, ISVs that use that
API might have to bundle it with every copy of their
program. Second, there may be a substantial lag before
all OEMs bundle the same set of APIs.37
Well and good, but the more important issue is whether we could achieve
the same technical benefits of integration or bundling seen by the court—
and for the purpose of coordination these are fungible—with across-thenetwork distribution while doing a better job of preserving competition.
C. Visibility, Presence and Price
How might we do that? Tying and/or bundling are notions too crude to
get at the issues in these markets. Instead, we should focus on three more
textured characteristics:
o Visibility (or advertising): What software does the OS make visible
to the end user?
o Presence: What software is available for use, either through preinstallation or by invocation across the network? and
o Price: Are separate charges set out for software or is one package
offered at a lump-sum price?
In each case, we need to focus on the costs and benefits of centralized provision and those of decentralized provision. Taken together, these three
characteristics create a rich framework for evaluating situations we would
otherwise lump under the tying/bundling rubric.

37
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We can now be more precise about our comparison of centralized
and decentralized software. What should limit the scope of centralized
provision of visibility, presence and price? The evidence in the case suggests that in the pre-network world, pre-installation was seen as the best
method of distributing software. Pre-installation meant both visibility
within Windows—either an icon on the desktop, a spot in the channel bar
or a line in the online services folder—and presence, as the relevant software was automatically installed on the computer prior to delivery.
As to presence, in the pre-network regime, we can’t install on demand over the network, meaning that we cannot distribute and pay at the
time that the end-user is ready to use the software. Instead, the software
must be made available ahead of time, either through pre-installation on
the hard disk or through availability on a CD. When I needed to install
the requested Hebrew font, the system asked me to insert my Windows
Update CD, which was where exactly? There are clear costs to IOD depending on how cumbersome/invisible the installation process is. Installation off of a CD is cumbersome, especially if this must occur repeatedly.
The decision to pre-load is essentially a forecast about the expected future
use of a product, the timing of that use and the cost of IOD. We need to
trade off the costs of pre-installation—even if in a hidden form only activated on request (invisible but present)—against the costs of true ondemand installation. The physical cost of pre-installation is largely just
hard disk space, which has, with the remarkable progress made in storage
technology, become less than dirt cheap.
So, in the pre-network era, maybe we pre-install a bunch of software, maybe we don’t, but focus on the question of payment. We need to
separate pre-installation from the question of whether the pre-installed
software is paid for as a group. Pre-installation is essentially about the cost
of distribution vs. the cost of storage. Pricing is a separate question. Again,
in the pre-network era, it is much more difficult to pay in real time when
the software is used (either initiating a purchase transaction or a rental
transaction). So we either bundle large amounts of software based on
some forecast about consumer demand, or we rely on the consequences of
large amounts of bundling for collapsing consumer demand valuations.38
Networked coordination eliminates many of these problems. In
this framework, the OS emerges as a key place in which software is advertised and purchase transactions are initiated. The real question is how
hard it is to organize a market in online software. Given the network, dis-

38

See Yannis Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits
and Efficiency, Management Science (December, 1999).
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tribution is easier, if not perfect. What may be harder is the organization
of payment, though if you have purchased any intangible good on the
Internet—audio files, for example—you understand that this is reasonably
straightforward. And some of the difficulties may be solved by the market
participants themselves. If software package A anticipates a file from software package B and that file is missing, networked coordination will allow
instant downloading, and payment may be made not by the consumer but
rather by company A to company B. Doing that would insulate the consumer from many of these online micro-transactions.
As to price, consider three cases: “integrated” software sold at a
price p; bundled software—bolted software—sold for p; and two “separate”
pieces of software, the first sold for p, with the second given away. In each
case, the consumer has access to all of the software and has parted with p.
Absent a meaningful price for the “second” piece of software—ignoring
transaction costs—consumers will treat these three situations identically.
Put differently, consumers would think of the OS as being bundled with
free complements and would not distinguish integration as a single product from bundling with “separate” free complements.
The antitrust tying analysis turns on distinguishing case 1 from
cases 2 and 3, though as suggested above, good software design principles
suggest that we should not try to distinguish these cases. How do transaction costs matter for these situations? Cases 1 and 2 are identical: the software is pre-installed and is made visible on the desktop. Pre-network, case
3 is quite different, as it was quite costly to distribute free software, as
those of us who use AOL sign-up software CDs for coasters are well
aware. The rise of the network brings case 3 substantially closer to cases 1
and 2, though gaps remain.
D. Three Examples of Free Complement Distribution
Focus on three real situations and consider the differences in actual distribution. In each case, we are looking at a free Windows complement, and
the only questions are visibility and presence. In Windows XP, Microsoft’s
next OS, Microsoft will have instant messaging come pre-installed and
visible, with no marginal price assigned to the IM component. Obviously,
this is software that is visible, present and free. In contrast, Microsoft has
announced that it will not distribute a Java virtual machine with Windows
XP, but instead will make one available for downloading from its website.39 Microsoft describes the Java code as “a lot of code that many users

39 See John R. Wilke and Don Clark, Microsoft Pulls Back Support for Java, Dealing
New Blow to Rival Technology, The Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2001.
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don’t need” but that of course is true of most possible features in the OS
and doesn’t provide a rational for distinguishing the decision on Windows
instant messaging software and Java. The IM software could just be visible
through a link for downloading the software for free from Microsoft’s
website. The only meaningful difference between these two situations is
that in the one case, the software is pre-installed—meaning installed by
the OEM for a consumer purchaser—and in the second the software is
installed over the network.
Compare the ease of use of Windows IM with that of another free
Windows complement—one partially decentrally coordinated—the
Adobe Acrobat Reader. Acrobat is a two-piece authoring and reading system. A person using the authoring program “prints” a document to a file,
creating a portable document that can be moved from computer to computer. This document will preserve the look and feel of the original document: it will appear on the second computer as it did on the first computer,
so long as the recipient has the Acrobat reader program to view and print
the file. The reading program is free and can be downloaded from
Adobe’s website; you have to buy the authoring program.
Acrobat files end in the three letter extension .pdf (thus the reason
they are frequently referred to as “pdf” files). If you obtain an Acrobat file
on your Windows 2000 machine and attempt to read it, if you have not
already downloaded the reader, you will not be able to open the file. Instead, a box will open with the heading “Open With …” and you will be
asked to select the program that you would like to use to open the file.
This box will come up, because Windows matches three letter suffixes to
programs, and will have looked on your computer in the table that
matches suffixes to programs. Since you do not have any program
matched with that suffix, it will ask you to make the match by hand.
Unlike pre-installation in XP of Windows IM or pre-linking and
therefore visibility of Java, Windows will tell you nothing about Acrobat.
Windows certainly could come with a table matching all three letter suffixes to programs and websites. Suffix tables are readily available on the
Internet, so this is not a hard problem.40 It turns out that there are multiple programs associated with the .pdf extension. For Adobe, this is its
portable document format and matches up with Acrobat. For Microsoft,
this is package definition file, and is used by its systems management
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for
example,
http://extsearch.com/,
http://filext.com/;
or
http://webopedia.internet.com/quick_ref/fileextensions.html (all visited on July 12,
2001).

Randal C. Picker, Pursuing a Remedy in Microsoft

30

server. Windows could offer links to both websites, and you would quickly
download the free Adobe reader.
Does this mean that our user will throw up her hands, curse and
stop? Probably not. For the Acrobat reader, we see decentralized, viral coordination: sites posting .pdf files frequently will also link to Adobe’s site
making clear how a user gets the free reader. A person distributing an Acrobat file can easily solve the linking problem that Windows XP will solve
for Java but won’t solve for Acrobat.
E. Pre-Installation Again
Should we think much turns on whether the free complement is distributed centrally? Should an antitrust result turn on the mechanics of installing the instant messenger software? The case for doing so would run
something like this. We can see the advantage of bundling in these examples. Pre-installation lowers the transaction costs of creating presence,
though the network has shrunk this advantage. Pre-installation usually
comes with visibility on the Windows desktop, but this is hardly the only
method of advertising. Pre-installation also lowers the transaction costs of
installation. We should expect that if we have two different pieces of software, with equal visibility on the desktop, we will see much greater use of
the software with a presence advantage. So even if we had icons on the
desktop for both IE and Navigator—or, in the new fight, of Windows IM
and say AOL’s version of IM—if IE was pre-installed and Navigator
could be installed by downloading over the network, IE would have a substantial advantage. Downloading can take forever, and a substantial percentage of download attempts fail.41
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On the liability claims, this leaves outstanding the claim of attempted monopolization
of the browser market, the third of the violations found by the District Court. One piece
of this, the alleged June, 1995 offer of market division to Netscape, may have great legal
significance, but it has zero scholarly significance. Of more interest is the District Court’s
conclusion that Microsoft’s success in the browser market adds credence to the attempted
monopolization claim. The lines here between success in legitimate competition and
attempted monopolization seem especially thin, with severe consequences for getting the
answer wrong. We will find a violation when we should not, or discourage beneficial
competition, much to consumer’s loss. All of this is especially troublesome in markets
that seem to tend to monopoly, so that the new competitor can tip into monopolization
quite quickly. The court of appeals ultimately rejected the attempted monopolization
claim based on the plaintiffs’ failure to define meaningfully the browser market or to
make out significant entry barriers in that market. Opinion at 64.
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V. Remedies
The court of appeals well-recognized the difficulty in identifying an appropriate remedy in this case:
… [S]ix years seems like an eternity in the computer
industry. By the time a court can assess liability, firms,
products and the marketplace are likely to have
changed dramatically. This, in turn, threatens enormous practical difficulties for courts considering the appropriate measure of relief in equitable enforcement actions, both in crafting injunctive remedies in the first
instance and reviewing those remedies in the second.
Conduct remedies may be unavailing in such cases, because innovation to a large degree has already rendered
the anticompetitive conduct obsolete (although by no
means harmless). And broader structural remedies present their own set of problems, including how a court
goes about restoring competition to a dramatically
changed, and constantly changing, marketplace.42
As the court itself noted,43 we could obviously just accept the state of the
market and move on, instead emphasizing deterring antitrust violations
and could do that through a very large penalty or through private damage
actions.
We should start with the remedy implemented by the lower court.
The Final Judgment in the District Court contemplated a two-stage remedy. The first stage would consist of so-called conduct remedies that originally were to go in effect in three months. (The District Court ultimately
stayed this remedy.) The second stage called for the break-up of Microsoft
into two entities, an operating system company and an everything else applications company. That remedy was to go in effect only after all appeals
had been resolved.
A. The Break Up
Of course, the appeals court ruling requires a fresh look at the remedies.
The break-up ruling was thrice damned, first by the partial reversal of the
liability ruling; second, by the finding that the lower court erred in failing
to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the remedy; and third, by the
conclusion that Judge Jackson’s extra-judicial statements created an
42

Opinion at 10-11 (emphasis in original).
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Randal C. Picker, Pursuing a Remedy in Microsoft

32

clusion that Judge Jackson’s extra-judicial statements created an appearance of bias that infected the remedies phase.
Although the appeals court leaves the possibility of a break-up on
the table, it notes that historically divestiture has been used for companies
that were merged together, so a break up simply takes the pieces apart and
restores the old situation. Microsoft, of course, was built from the ground
up as a single company. While it frequently buys software and makes it its
own—as it did with DOS itself—mergers have played no role in Microsoft’s amazing growth or in the dominance of Windows. The D.C. Circuit
also hinted that there was only a weak causal connection between Microsoft’s exclusionary conduct and its market dominance, suggesting that the
court thought a break-up unwarranted.
Indeed, the government’s vision behind the break up has never
been very clear. It seems fair to say that the government felt that it got
burned in its prior settlement with Microsoft and was loathe to repeat that
experience. The conduct remedies might give Microsoft wiggle room that
would render those remedies empty, as had occurred before. The break up
would also limit the possibility of ongoing monitoring and supervision by
the government of Microsoft. That is to be applauded, but taking Microsoft into the back yard and shooting it would do that as well, yet that
hardly suggests it is a sensible remedy.
On a more theoretical level, it is possible to articulate only a weak
basis for the break up. One concern is that Microsoft has given its inhouse applications developers special information about the Windows applications programming interface (API), and that cleaving Microsoft will
eliminate that problem. That is true, but the government made nothing of
this in the case, so it is unlikely it should play a role in the design of the
remedy.
A second possibility is that separation will lead to operating system
competition. The story would go something like this. The single most important application is Microsoft Office. Microsoft must consider how decisions for Office alter the position of Windows. Macintosh conspiracy
theorists have long believed that Microsoft has intentionally delayed Office for the Mac as a way to weaken the Mac as a competing OS. Indeed,
as noted above, the government alleged that Microsoft threatened to kill
off Mac Office if Apple didn’t support Internet Explorer. Separate Office
from Windows and the applications company will make clean decisions on
whether to extend Office to other platforms and will not favor Windows.
Or so the story goes. The reality, of course, is that with Windows
as the dominant OS, AppCo would almost certainly focus its resources on
Windows. If we assume that AppCo can’t just scale up immediately so
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that it does face internal constraints, we would expect Windows to continue to get priority. Any new OS would face the standard chicken-andegg problem: developers don’t want to develop for small OSs, and consumers won’t adopt the OS if there are no applications. If this is the point
of the separation, rather than administrative convenience, it is hard to see
how this will work.
B. The Conduct Remedies and Coordination
What this will also not do is address the key issue of facilitating the transition from centralized coordination of software sharing to networked coordination. Simply popping Windows into OSCo will not change the ability
of Microsoft to use Windows to coordinate software sharing. That is a
good thing if we believe that Microsoft needs to continue to play that role,
but unfortunate if we can now move to networked coordination. Absent
controls on Microsoft’s decisions to incorporate features into the OS, it
can continue to claim that it should be the only seller of shared software
and can enforce that claim by bundling the software together and selling it
for a single price.
That is what must be addressed, and the original conduct remedies
actually do a much better job of this. Section 3 of the Final Judgment set
out nine conduct remedies, some with subparts. Microsoft’s proposed final
judgment set forth five conduct remedies. There was some overlap in concept between the two, even if there was enormous difference in the nittygritty. As is common, these remedies focus on non-discrimination, both as
among various groups of outsiders (Dell v. Compaq) as well as as between
outsiders and Microsoft. The remedies also attempt to address overall
software competition, including dealing with Microsoft’s ability to bundle
together software, plus possible disclosure obligations for Microsoft.
1. STRUCTURING SOFTWARE MARKET COMPETITION
Microsoft distorted the distribution of software through its monopoly
maintenance; the right remedy for that it is to distort back against Microsoft for a period, and then make sure that Microsoft is not able to distort
distribution again. The presence of the always-on network means that we
can do this while minimizing possible harms to consumers from introducing a corrective distortion. A remedy should consist of five central features:
1. DI Visibility Flexibility. There should be no mandatory icons on
the Windows desktop or spots reserved in the Start Menu or its
equivalent. Distribution intermediaries would have complete
freedom to add or subtract icons from the interface.
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2.

Mandatory Versioning. During the remedial period—see 5 below—Microsoft should be required to issue Windows versions
with and without any new middleware that it adds to Windows.
For this to be meaningful, this means that the baseline Windows
XP could not include instant messaging and the Windows media
player, but that those features could be included in an upgraded
version of Windows XP. Microsoft could charge the same price
for basic and deluxe versions of Windows.
3. Direct Distribution Only Period. For a moratorium period, perhaps of six months to 2 years, Microsoft should be able to distribute through distributional intermediaries only the baseline
Windows without the new middleware. Microsoft would be able
to distribute such middleware only through downloading from its
website or through direct distribution of CDs to end-users.
4. DI Neutrality. After the moratorium period, we should rely on
competition among software producers and others for DI shelf
space—hard disk space for OEMs, web presence for Internet
service providers and others—to control software distribution
abuses, and should only seek to control possible abuses of market
power by limiting conditions that Microsoft can impose on DIs.
Mandatory versioning would be continued during this second
period.
5. Sunset. All of these provisions should sunset, perhaps after a period of three years.
The analysis of bundling above suggests three characteristics of interest:
visibility, presence and price. These remedies address each of these directly. As discussed below, in the Final Judgment, Sections 3(a)(iii) and
3(g) come closest to addressing these issues. Section 3(a)(iii) addresses
OEM flexibility in product configuration, while Section 3(g) controls attempts by Microsoft to “bind” software to the OS. Before looking at these
in detail, consider what we should want to accomplish.
A. Visibility Possibilities
The D.C. Circuit concluded that Microsoft used its control over visibility
within Windows to disadvantage Netscape Navigator so as to maintain its
monopoly over operating systems for Intel-based computers. An appropriate remedy should control visibility. We could imagine a range of a possible approaches here:
o The Neutrality Trustee. We could appoint a trustee with the power
to supervise—regulate—the process by which Microsoft puts icons
on its desktop or application names in folders visible from the Start
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Menu. Trustees of this sort are increasingly common to implement
antitrust remedies or settlements; for example, there will be a
monitor trustee in the AOL–Time Warner merger to manage the
process of ISP access to AOL/TW’s cable network.44
o Lotteries. We could try to remove as much discretion as possible
from this process of creating visibility within Windows. Again, focus on the inclusion of ISPs in the online services folder. We could
arbitrarily choose to have ten listed and simply hold a lottery for
the slots, while allowing secondary sales of the slots.
o Auctions. Microsoft would simply auction off the ten spots. This is
very much like the lottery proposal, except that Microsoft gets the
money that might otherwise flow to lottery winners.
o DI Visibility Flexibility. We could simply free the distributional intermediaries of restrictions by Microsoft, allow them to make
choices, and assume/hope that competition among the DIs will
lead to smart choices. A rule of no mandatory icons or folders—no
mandatory visibility for Microsoft software or services on the Windows desktop—would accomplish this result. Could an OEM provide a blank desktop? Sure, but it would probably not stay in business very long.
I think one of these —freeing the DIs—clearly dominates the others, and Section 3(a)(iii) of the Final Judgment basically embraces this
idea.45 Interjecting a trustee would make the interface design decisions
44

See U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Decision and Order In the Matter of America
Online, Inc. and Time Warner, Inc., Dec. 14, 2000 (available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/aoldando.pdf).
45 OEM Flexibility in Product Configuration. Microsoft shall not restrict (by contract or
otherwise, including but not limited to granting or withholding consideration) an OEM
from modifying the boot sequence, startup folder, internet connection wizard, desktop,
preferences, favorites, start page, first screen, or other aspect of a Windows Operating
System Product to—
(1) include a registration sequence to obtain subscription or other information from
the user;
(2) display icons of or otherwise feature other products or services, regardless of the
size or shape of such icons or features, or to remove the icons, folders, start menu
entries, or favorites of Microsoft products or services;
(3) display any user interfaces, provided that an icon is also displayed that allows the
user to access the Windows user interface; or
(4) launch automatically any non-Microsoft Middleware, Operating System or application, offer its own Internet Access provider or other start-up sequence, or
offer an option to make non-Microsoft Middleware the Default Middleware
and to remove the means of End-User Access for Microsoft’s Middleware
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intensely regulatory and would almost certainly impose law speed as a
powerful brake on making tech progress. Lotteries or mandatory auctions46 would be less cumbersome, but each would depend on the key step
of defining the good in question, and that would probably involve a regulatory step. In contrast, DI freedom avoids all of this, and so long as that
market is competitive, should achieve a good result.
I should note that the more difficult we make it for Microsoft to
get out its version of the Windows interface, the more likely it will look
for other means of distributing Windows. Obviously, it does this to some
extent through direct sales to consumers, but Microsoft could decide to
vertically integrate and enter the PC business directly. It also could redefine the OS and offer all DIs the same very limited operating system, requiring almost automatic upgrades directly from Microsoft before an enduser could use a new PC.
B. Presence Possibilities
The DI flexibility provision addresses visibility. Consider presence and focus on three possible approaches to achieving neutral presence:
o Opening Windows to Others and The Neutrality Trustee. Our neutrality trustee also could have the power to require Microsoft to distribute third party software with Windows. This would be a form
of open access regime of the sort debated in the context of ISP access to cable lines.
o Minimal Bundling and Installation over the Network. We could look
for a common denominator for distribution, and the always-on
network is a natural choice. If Microsoft wants to add instant messaging to Windows, make it post the code on its website, and let
users go to that site to download it. This would create greater parity between the Window IM and all of the other versions of IM,
including those of AOL and Yahoo.
o DIs. Again, by freeing DIs of Microsoft restrictions, we could hope
that we would free competition. Microsoft could offer Windows to
DIs, the DIs could reject it. Microsoft could offer free Windows
add-ons to DIs, and they could reject those as well. Other software
producers would compete with Microsoft by offering their software
to OEMs for pre-installation.
Product.
46

Although Microsoft is frequently criticized for the deals that it cuts with third parties
to distribute their software through Windows, deals for cash, rather than for anticompetitive benefits, should not be problematic, and would be akin to Microsoft voluntarily embracing the auction idea.

Randal C. Picker, Pursuing a Remedy in Microsoft

37

Consider each of these and start by returning to the bundling discussion. I suggested there that, even in the networked world, preinstallation of software might confer a substantial advantage due to reduced transaction costs. That means we should look to a level playing field
for pre-installation and the three ideas above are different approaches.
The idea of opening Windows to others and putting a government
agent squarely in the middle of choosing what goes into Windows should
be self-refuting. This would be a feeding frenzy and coupling that with
processes that would make a lawyer happy would mean that the next
Windows operating system would not be Windows XP but Windows
3000. The Final Judgment sensibly avoided even the hint of this idea, and
it should not be considered now merely because the break-up has been
killed off, at least for now, by the D.C. Circuit.
Less intrusively, we would come closer to achieving competitive
neutrality and thereby also guard against additional attempts at monopoly
maintenance if we required Microsoft to live with the same acrossnetwork installation used by its competitors. In many ways, the question of
whether we want to try to police tying to the OS with the network in
place turns on these questions about the mechanics of distributing software. The analysis cuts both ways. If we think that we might cause serious
consumer harm by requiring Windows IM to be installed across the network, then we also should think that Microsoft has a competitive advantage by pre-installing it. If we think that it would be a small matter to
force Microsoft to be an outsider to Windows—to force it to have new
features downloaded—then we probably lose little by doing so, and this
has the benefit that third parties now have access to the same tools of decentralized coordination.
If your reaction to this idea is, “You’ve got to be kidding, you expect me to install my software over the network, using a 56K modem that
disconnects every 5 minutes,” two responses. First, if that is a serious
point, you get a good sense of the distributional advantage Microsoft may
have by simply being able to add software to Windows. Second, you
should get used to this idea, because the coming world of online software
services, such as Microsoft’s .Net initiative, is precisely about this kind of
software distribution.
On the question of whether pre-installation or downloading matters, we should look to the behavior of participants in the industry. Certainly in the pre-network era, there is little doubt that distribution with
Windows was seen by most industry players as quite valuable. This fact
drove the card game described earlier. Even now, we should look to Microsoft’s decisions in including and excluding items from Windows XP as
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providing valuable information. Microsoft explains the choice to exclude
Java as in part about irrelevance, in part about contract dispute fallout, but
it seems clear that the decision is also partially strategic. Microsoft will
make it harder for Java distribution if Java is unbundled from Windows, so
that Java is visible from within Windows but must be installed over the
network. In similar fashion, Microsoft intends pre-installation of Windows instant messenger, not just visibility coupled with downloading.
These decisions suggest that Microsoft itself believes that something turns
on the mechanics of distribution, even with an always-on network.
Finally, consider the third idea, competition at the OEM level. Although Microsoft sells CDs directly to consumers, its main way of distributing Windows to consumers is through deals with OEMs, who preinstall Windows before shipping their computers. The OEMs are then a
key means of distributing software, and we could just look to strengthen
competition there. We clearly can achieve some of that through remedies
directed at Microsoft’s contracting practices (see the next section below),
but the real question is whether we need to control the scope of Windows,
whether achieved through integration or bundling, and pricing. Mandatory versioning, discussed in the next subsection, would address the former
issue, and, as set forth in two subsections, I am skeptical that the case
makes out a basis for controlling pricing of Microsoft’s Windows add-on
components.
Unleashing the forces of competition at the DI level will be quite
powerful, as the early evidence, courtesy of AOL, suggests. Press reports
describe an aggressive campaign by AOL to alter the Windows desktop to
advertise AOL and to include a series of pop-up notices at various points
in the user experience as an additional nudge. Besides whatever lump-sum
payments AOL might make to OEMs, it would pay $35 a head for signups. Consumer advocates are nervous about this, and Microsoft describes
the behavior as “anti-consumer,” but this is precisely what we should hope
would happen, multiplied many-fold.47
We also need to address direct sales to consumers off of CDs. Microsoft has no unique distributional advantage there—AOL, among others, has demonstrated that it can create CDs with the best of them. Could
Microsoft have an advantage in obtaining shelf space? That takes us to
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Facts taken from Alec Klein, “AOL to Offer Bounty for Space on New PCs,” The
Washington Post, July 25, 2001. See also Rebecca Buckman and Gary McWilliams,
“Compaq to Give AOL’s Web Service Exclusive Position on Most XP PCs,” The Wall
Street Journal, July 27, 2001.
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another complex antitrust area,48 but in any event, nothing in the case as
litigated really addresses this issue.
As to presence, I have suggested above a two-period remedy, a
downloading only period followed by a period of DI neutrality. The core
notion here is that the central harm of Microsoft’s monopoly maintenance
was the distributional disadvantage it imposed on competitors. We should
seek to restore competition and undo the harm created by Microsoft’s activities by relatively disadvantaging Microsoft’s distribution. One approach that might do that and do the best job of restoring competition
would be to do both the mandatory downloading remedy and the OEM
neutrality remedy, in sequence, as described above. Note that the Final
Judgment makes no effort to remedy directly the consequences of the distribution advantage created by Microsoft’s behavior. The break-up remedy didn’t get at this, and the conduct remedies ignore the issue as well.
The suggested two-step distributional remedy gets at this directly.
It is important to acknowledge that the first stage of this remedy,
direct distribution only, would likely impose extra transaction costs on at
least some consumers. Indeed, the point of the remedy is to make it more
difficult for Microsoft to distribute its software for a period to correct for
the distributional advantages it obtained from its illegal monopoly maintenance. Whether we should impose the direct distribution remedy or instead just skip ahead to the period of DI neutrality will clearly turn on the
size of the losses imposed on consumers during the first period, a matter as
to which evidence might be taken during the new remedies phase in the
district court.
The merits of this also turn on one’s sense of how equilibria are restored in distorted markets. Compare two situations. In the first, think of a
ball in a bowl, where the ball artificially sits on a ledge in the bowl and
thus cannot come to rest at the bottom of the bowl. Remove the ledge and
we know that the ball will get to its resting spot, just as it would have had
the barrier never existed. In the second, think of one ball and many bowls.
Here the artificial act pushed us from one bowl to another, and in the second bowl, the ball sits on the ledge. Remove the barrier and the ball
comes to rest in the second bowl, but without a nudge, we never get back
to the first bowl.
If you believe that just preventing Microsoft from engaging in
anti-competitive behavior going forward will suffice to restore competition, we don’t need the direct-distribution-only remedy. Yes, it would also
48

See, for example, Joseph Farrell, Some Thoughts on Slotting Allowances and Exclusive
Dealing, U.S. Department of Justice, March 28, 2001.
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act as a penalty, which would help to deter future violations, but we can do
that directly through monetary fines, and those will not risk disrupting
consumer transactions. If instead you believe that Microsoft’s behavior has
pushed us into the wrong bowl, then we need something like the directdistribution-only remedy to help to restore competition, and we need to
make sure that the gains to consumers of doing that exceed the interim
losses that may be imposed on them.
C. Mandatory Versioning
Both the period of direct distribution and the period of meaningful DI
neutrality depend on the notion of mandatory versioning. Section 3(g) of
the Final Judgment relies on that as well, so consider it for specificity:
g. Restriction on Binding Middleware Products to Operating System Products. Microsoft shall not, in any Operating System Product distributed six or more months after the effective date of this
Final Judgment, Bind any Middleware Product to a Windows Operating System unless:
i. Microsoft also offers an otherwise identical version of
that Operating System Product in which all means of EndUser Access to that Middleware Product can readily be removed (a) by OEMs as part of standard OEM preinstallation kits and (b) by end users using add-remove
utilities readily accessible in the initial boot process and
from the Windows desktop; and
ii. when an OEM removes End-User Access to a Middleware Product from any Personal Computer on which Windows is pre-installed, the royalty paid by that OEM for that
copy of Windows is reduced in an amount not less than the
product of the otherwise applicable royalty and the ratio of
the number of amount in bytes of binary code of (a) the
Middleware Product as distributed separately from a Windows Operating System Product to (b) the applicable version of Windows.
This obviously depends on the definitions49—a matter of substantial importance and dispute—but ignore those for now and focus on the concepts
at work.
49

Here are the key definitions:
r. “Middleware Product” means
i. Internet browsers, e-mail client software, multimedia viewing software, instant messaging software, and voice recognition software, or
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It is important that Microsoft can continue to innovate by making
features available from the OS. Like the neutrality trustee straw-man set
forth above, any structure that required pre-clearance of new features of
Windows would create an intolerable burden on software innovation, one
that in many ways would track the line of commerce restrictions that
emerged from the break-up of AT&T.50 In Sec. 3(g), the government
understood this and avoided that kind of barrier to innovation.
At the same time, if Microsoft can just continue to add features to
Windows to be accepted by market participants on a mandatory basis, Microsoft can repeat the behavior of this case and continue to maintain the
dominance of Windows. The trick is to allow innovation, while controlling what Microsoft can do.
Mandatory versioning creates the infrastructure to accomplish this
result. My version of this is different from that in Sec. 3(g) in an important way, as I will describe below, but the core idea is similar. We need to
make it possible for DIs to reject Windows features. Obviously there is an
important question of scope—which features are we talking about—and
the elided definitions issue above gets to that. But on the rejection notion,
only if Microsoft is forced to present multiple version of Windows to DIs
do we make it possible for features to be rejected. The requirement that
Microsoft separate out middleware components means that we will not
end up with Microsoft middleware, visible and present, simply because
Microsoft controls the content of Windows. Sec. 3(g)(i) takes away that
ii. software distributed by Microsoft that –
(1) is, or has in the applicable preceding year been, distributed
separately from an Operating System Product in the retail
channel or through Internet access providers, Internet content
providers, ISVs or OEMs, and
(2) provides functionality similar to that provided by Middleware offered by a competitor to Microsoft.
q. “Middleware” means software that operates, directly or through other software, between an Operating System and another type of software (such as an
application, a server Operating System, or a database management system) by
offering services via APIs or Communications Interfaces to such other software,
and could, if ported to or interoperable with multiple Operating Systems, enable
software products written for that Middleware to be run on multiple Operating
System Products. Examples of Middleware within the meaning of this Final
Judgment include Internet browsers, e-mail client software, multimedia viewing
software, Office, and the Java Virtual Machine. Examples of software that are
not Middleware within the meaning of this Final Judgment are disk compression and memory management.
50 For discussion, see Howard A. Shelanski and J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture
in Network Industries, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 95-96 (2001).
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control. This will permit level competition in free middleware software
components, whether done through the downloading remedy or simply
through competition at the DI level.
Mandatory versioning is also important if we want to implement
the first stage of the two-stage remedy I have suggested. Achieving DI
neutrality going forward will do nothing to remedy the harms to competition inflicted by Microsoft through its distortion of the channels of distribution. The natural remedy for that is a corresponding correction, a period
of distortion against Microsoft. The suggested moratorium period is an
approach to that. It is inconceivable that we would want to stop all distribution of Windows through DIs for any period. Absent mandatory versioning, if we just achieve DI neutrality, this would mean that Microsoft
would distribute Windows XP through the DIs as presented by Microsoft
to the DIs.
With mandatory versioning, we can implement the corrective
moratorium period. Microsoft would distribute the baseline Windows systems—think of this casually as Windows 2000 or Windows ME—
through DIs. Microsoft could distribute the full Windows XP directly to
end-users, through its website or via CD. Microsoft’s Windows Update
feature would facilitate downloading of the add-ons for consumers who
want them.
D. Pricing Add-On Components
Sec. 3(g)(ii) of the Final Judgment will impose a mandatory price gap between the basic version of Windows and more advanced versions in sales
to DIs. The impetus behind it is clear. On this story, if Microsoft can continue to incorporate features into the OS and not offer a separate charge
for those features, it will make it very difficult for competing features to
arise. On my story, that may have made sense in the pre-network world
where it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to coordinate distribution of those features from someone other than Microsoft, but it is hard
to justify in the networked world.
The problem is that the case as litigated to date does not really
support a price remedy. Consider the following two scenarios. Assume we
require installation over the network for “new” Windows functions, such
as instant messaging. Microsoft announces its price for Windows Basic.
Users can upgrade to Windows Deluxe by downloading the free Microsoft
instant messaging program from its website. Competitors can post their
IM software on their websites, and competition ensues. Consider version
2 of this scenario where we look to foster competition at the DI level. Microsoft produces Windows Basic and Windows Deluxe. It sells them at the
same price to OEMs who choose one or the other. Competitors can also
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go to OEMs and offer free software for installation, and again OEMs are
free to accept or reject the software.
In both cases, Microsoft receives the same payment for Windows
Basic and makes the additional component available for no separate
charge. As discussed above, this two-piece pricing strategy—one free
component, a complement for sale—is common in the software business.
Sec. 3(g)(ii) would deny Microsoft—and only Microsoft—access to this
strategy. The government wants the price reduction clause because otherwise “OEMs, in effect, … pay for Microsoft Middleware Products, even if
they want to remove them, and thus would provide a substantial disincentive for the OEMs to license and install competing Middleware Products,
thereby foreclosing opportunities for those products to create competition
for the Windows platform.”51
There is something of a sleight of hand here. It is always the case
in the two-piece pricing strategy that someone “in effect” has to pay for
the free component elsewhere. But that hardly represents a reason for not
allowing the strategy, as we would clearly permit it in a competitive market. Moreover, in some sense, anyone has the power to set the price of the
complement at zero. Microsoft can do so, but so can AOL and Yahoo, as
they indeed have done.
The D.C. circuit addressed price issues at a number of points in its
opinion. The lower court did not find that Microsoft engaged in predatory
pricing, and given that, the court of appeals stated:
The rare case of price predation aside, the antitrust laws
do not condemn even a monopolist for offering its
product at an attractive price, and we therefore have no
warrant to condemn Microsoft for offering either IE or
the IEAK [Internet Explorer Access Kit] free of charge
or even at a negative price.52
With good reason, as we know that the fear of antitrust liability for low
prices will interfere with a firm’s willingness to reduce prices, and that is a
central driver of consumer benefits in competitive markets. Predatory pricing cases are hard to make out generally and that should be especially so
in software markets where we see even new firms give away their products. Without much more extensive development on the tying remand, I

51

Plaintiffs’ Summary Response, Comment 3.g.[2].

52

Opinion at 42.
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see no basis in the case for the pricing remedy that Sec. 3(g)(ii) represents.53
E. Administration and Alternatives
There have been a number of explicit or implicit lines drawn in the core
five remedies, and I should discuss those. There are at least three key
questions:
o Should the remedies apply to so-called middleware add-ons or to
all add-ons?
o Should the remedies look backward, so that we could define certain functions as add-ons and subject those to the same set of
remedies? and
o Are there different costs in unbundling or de-integrating, so that
removing function visibility and access should suffice without the
additional step of limiting presence?
First, the DI visibility flexibility remedy would apply to all icons, so
that there would be no mandatory icons or other functionality entrance
points. That would apply to middleware—things we think might have
platform potential and therefore compete with the OS—as well as other
new functions, such as Windows XP’s planned “Scanner & Camera Wizard,” which presumably will not emerge as a competitor of the OS. Although a plausible case could be made out for distinguishing these, the
administrative costs of doing so probably would be high, and in my judgment, the cleaner remedy is no mandatory icons.
Second, the mandatory versioning remedy, which in turn feeds
into the two distribution remedies, would be limited to middleware, however defined. Differences between the government’s definition and that of
Microsoft would have to be resolved,54 but the focus is platform potential.
This presumably would not cover the Scanner & Camera Wizard—an
item of some controversy.55 Here the right default rule is exclusion, so that
53

There are also mechanical questions about the workings of Sec. 3(g)(ii). When we
distribute the Middleware Product separately can we do so without shared components
and the expected components? The royalty reduction is then only calculated based upon
the unique components that come with the product; this effectively would assign the
revenues associated with the shared component to the OS. If, in contrast, and this is
probably what is intended, the middleware product calculation must include all shared
components, this leaves the royalty as only those components that are unique to the OS.
54

See Secs. 7.q. and 7.r. of the Final Judgment and Defendant Microsoft Corporation’s
Comments on Plaintiffs’ Revised Proposed Final Judgment, Comments on Secs. 7.q. and
7.r. (filed with the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, May 31, 2000).
55

See July 24, 2001 Letter of Sen. Charles Schumer (D-NY) to Microsoft CEO Steve
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we have identified the precise scope of the burden imposed on Microsoft.
That does have the disadvantage of requiring us to tie down a vision of
middleware now, but the alternative seemingly is to require Microsoft to
separate out all new features from Windows proper. Certainly without a
resolution of the tying claim—and recall that I think Microsoft should win
that claim as to the browser—there would seem to be little basis for forcing Microsoft to separate out all new features. Put differently, we are entitled to remedy what Microsoft did, but that does not empower us to impose a broad open access obligation on Windows. That said, on remand,
the district court should conduct hearings to determine the costs of implementing mandatory versioning. The lower the costs of doing so, the more
we should fold into the middleware category, given the difficulties of forecasting what will emerge as a platform possibility.
Finally, what we learn about the costs of mandatory versioning
should also help us determine whether we should just live with the
flexibility remedy and not pursue my suggested distributional remedies. As
discussed above, this turns on part on the question of how competition is
restored to a market infected with prior anti-competitive acts. AOL’s recent efforts with OEMs to increase its visibility on the desktop suggests
the icon remedy itself may be quite powerful, and mandatory versioning
will clearly impose extra costs. That said, versioning is an extraordinarily
common strategy in information markets,56 so we should be skeptical of
the claim that we would be forcing Microsoft to do something that can be
done only with great difficulty. It is done all of the time.
2. SECTION 3(G) DETAILS
While Sec. 3(g) clearly has price consequences, standing alone, it is not
crystal clear whether this is also a visibility remedy and/or presence remedy. The definition of “End-User Access,” set forth in Sec. 7(j) of the Final Judgment, helps to sort this out:
“End-User Access” means the invocation of Middleware directly or indirectly by an end user of a Personal
Computer or the ability of such an end user to invoke
Middleware. “End-User Access” includes invocation of
Middleware by end users which is compelled by the design of the Operating System Product.
Start with the second sentence of the definition. As discussed above, the
appeals court found that at least some invocations of IE by the operating
Ballmer; see also John R. Wilke and James Bandler, “New Digital Camera Deals Kodak
A Lesson in Microsoft’s Methods,” The Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2001, p.1.
56

On this, see Carl Shapiro and Hal R. Varian, Information Rules Ch. 3 (1999).
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system were not shown to be anti-competitive steps of monopoly maintenance. I argued that the court paid too little attention to the possibility
that these design choices, such as the use of ActiveX controls, were made
simply to exclude the use of Navigator. That said, absent smoking emails
of the sort seen in this case, it will be difficult to sort out whether, for example, an ActiveX control was used in presenting help info on the OS because it made sense or because it justified the presence of IE on the computer. The second sentence flatly bars Microsoft from designing to anything other than the lowest common denominator—the features supported by all browsers—and that seems like a serious mistake.57
Turn to the first sentence. The limit on “direct” invocation of
Middleware sounds like a visibility remedy. So remove the icons from the
desktop and take it out of the Start Menu, but leave the underlying software on the computer itself. The limit on “indirect” invocation sounds
much more like a presence remedy, so that, to use Microsoft’s example,
Intuit’s Quicken could not invoke IE to get supplemental information for
a consumer from Intuit’s website. To limit indirect invocation means that
the software either isn’t present or is present but dead to all uses.58
That makes this both a visibility and a presence remedy. The basis
for the visibility remedy is the potential consumer confusion issue discussed by the D.C. Circuit. The basis for the presence remedy is the fragmentation rationale, namely, that the presence of Microsoft’s middleware
will make it much more difficult for competing middleware to gain a sufficiently large user base to cover the fixed costs of software development,
and that in turn will deter middleware entry.59 Both of these are aspects of
the D.C. Circuit’s conclusions regarding design monopoly maintenance,
and do not depend necessarily on how the tying remand is resolved. That
said, as a remedy for the design monopoly maintenance violation, this

57

Microsoft sought to rewrite this sentence to make clear that it could indeed use IE to
display the Windows help system, but the government rejected the changes. Compare
Defendant Microsoft Corporation’s Comments on Plaintiffs’ Revised Proposed Final
Judgment, Comment 2 on Sec. 7(j) (filed with the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, May 31, 2000) with Plaintiffs’ Summary Response to Microsoft’s Comments
on Revised Proposed Final Judgment, Comment 7.j.[2] (filed with the same court on
June 5, 2000).
58

Again, Microsoft sought a change suggesting that “indirectly” be deleted, see Microsoft Comments, Comment 1 on Sec. 7(j), and again the government rejected the change.
See Plaintiffs’ Summary Response 7.j.[1].
59

See TAN supra.
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should be limited to software that might reasonably act as a platform alternative to Windows.60
3. QUARANTINING MONOPOLY POWER ABUSE
Given the core finding of monopoly maintenance, I would expect an imposed remedy or a consensual settlement to include the following provisions—all of which are taken from the Final Judgment—to attempt to
create a structure to constrain Microsoft’s ability to misuse its monopoly
position:
o DIs. Microsoft will be barred from taking adverse actions against a
distributional intermediary for the DI’s actions as to any product
that competes with a Microsoft product (3(a)(i), 3(d)). Microsoft
will be required to offer uniform terms for licensing Windows
(3(a)(ii)). Both of these will reduce Microsoft’s ability to pressure
DIs to comply with Microsoft dictates.
o Technical Impairment. Microsoft will be barred from some form of
taking actions that degrade the performance of competitor middleware. (3(c).)
o Agreements Limiting Competition, Exclusive Dealing and Contractual
Tying. To combat the Apple situation, where Microsoft was found
to have threatened to kill off or delay Office if Apple didn’t see the
light, Microsoft will be barred in some form from inducing a thirdparty from limiting its development of software. (3(h).) In the proposed final judgments from the government and Microsoft, there
was conceptual overlap with important difference in details.
Microsoft would also face limits on its ability to engage in exclusive
dealing (3(e)) and contractual tying (3(f)). Of course, it was precisely a similar limit on contractual tying that led to Microsoft II, so
there is good reason to think this may work poorly.
As to all of these, the precise details will be difficult, but for better or
worse, we can expect the remedy here to address all of these issues.
4. DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS
Sec. 3(b) of the Final Judgment would impose a different nondiscrimination obligation on Microsoft relating to the disclosure of APIs,
communications interfaces and technical information. The shadow case
against Microsoft claims that Microsoft uses its superior knowledge of the

60

One more remedy for software market structure should be noted. The remedies suggested by both Microsoft and the plaintiffs would require Microsoft to continue to sell its
old operating system for three years at a capped price when it released a new OS.
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insides of Windows to help it write applications for Windows, such as Microsoft Office. Many of these claims crystallize around the notion that
Windows has non-disclosed APIs (the applications programming interface), hooks in the software that developers use to share code from Windows itself. Sec. 3(b) would require Microsoft to disclose the APIs and
other related information to outsiders, just as it does to Microsoft insiders.
The underlying claim is somewhat interesting. Microsoft is in a
tricky position in both wanting developers to create applications for Windows and in also competing directly in that market. Developers would like
assurances that the Microsoft will not disadvantage outsiders in that competition, etc. As a practical matter, it would seem some inside advantage is
almost inevitable even if Microsoft did its utmost to maintain equality between insider and outsiders.
In any event, the APIs allegation has played no direct role in the
case itself, and therefore as a “remedy” it appears to come out of the blue.
Microsoft quite understandably sees this as a forced transfer of its valuable
intellectual property.61 It might be true that disclosure would foster
competition in the applications market, but that is not what the plaintiffs’
case was about. Instead it was about competition in the operating systems
market, and more particularly it was about Microsoft’s ability to use
Windows as a device for making visible and present additions to the OS
that would compete with products such as Navigator and Java. The
questioned conduct related to integration and tying and therefore as I
have talked about things, visibility and presence, and not to a use of insider knowledge. I thus see little basis, within the confines of the case
itself, for a broad disclosure obligation such as that set forth in Sec. 3(b).
Will this mean that Microsoft will have a sizable advantage over
outsiders? Probably, but unless we think that the finding of monopoly
maintenance means that Microsoft forfeits everything associated with the
monopoly that it lawfully acquired, we need some limiting principle, and a
tie to what actually animated the case makes sense. In contrast, to prevent
Microsoft from using API disclosure to third parties as a club, we must
have the same non-discrimination duty among outsiders that I have already discussed. Microsoft proposed a version of this in its proposed remedy.62

61

See Microsoft Corporation’s Reply to Plaintiffs’ Response to Microsoft’s Comments
on Their Revised Proposed Final Judgment (filed on June 6, 2000 with the D.C. District Court).
62

See Proposed Remedy ¶ 6.
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Conclusion
In this paper, I make a number of points about the Microsoft case itself and
the next steps that should take place. In particular, I argue that:
o No Liability for Tying. Microsoft should not be found liable under
the Sherman Act for tying Internet Explorer to Windows. In the
pre-networked world, Windows played the central role in coordinating the sharing of software. Incorporating a browser would
have been perfectly consistent with that role.
o The Drop in the Cost of Software Coordination. The rise of the network changes how software should be distributed and changes the
role of Windows in software coordination. There is less of a need
for mandatory incorporation of software into Windows, as decentralized distribution and coordination is now possible.
o Distorted Distribution Channels. As found by the D.C. Circuit, Microsoft engaged in impermissible monopoly maintenance. In so
doing, Microsoft distorted the channels for software distribution
and added software to Windows for the purpose of raising the cost
of distribution of rival software.
o Distribution Remedies. A proportionate Microsoft remedy should
address that distributional distortion and seek to prevent future distortions. These remedies should:
o foster desktop flexibility for distributional intermediaries, so
that there are no mandatory icons on the Windows desktop or
spots reserved in the Start Menu or its equivalent;
o require Microsoft to engage in mandatory versioning, so that it
issues Windows versions with and without any new middleware that it adds to Windows;
o impose a moratorium period of six months to 2 years during
which Microsoft would be able to distribute through distributional intermediaries only the baseline Windows without new
middleware, while permitting distribution of the full version of
Windows via CD or Microsoft’s website;
o after the moratorium period, rely on competition among software producers and others for distributional intermediary shelf
space to control software distribution abuses; and
o sunset, perhaps after a period of three years.
o Equilibria and Restoring Competition in Distorted Markets. The direct-distribution-only remedy will likely impose interim costs on
consumers. We need to assess those costs and understand whether
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they need to be paid. That turns in part on whether preventing
further anti-competitive acts will suffice to create the competitive
level that would have existed absent Microsoft’s acts, or whether
such competition can be restored only through a more direct
measure such as the suggested direct-distribution-only remedy.
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